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 Abstract 
There are over 20 million victims of trafficking from more than 136 countries in the 
world. This thesis takes a closer look at this modern form of slavery, in particular the 
nonlinear relation between gender equality and human trafficking outflows. My main 
hypothesis is that an increase in gender equality first has a positive effect on the 
amount of trafficking outflows and then a negative effect as countries become more 
egalitarian. 
 
Using cross-national data from the World Bank and from the Trafficking in Persons 
Report 2006 (UNODC, 2006) I find a nonlinear relationship between female labour 
force participation, the share of women in parliament and trafficking outflows. In line 
with the literature on human trafficking I base my arguments on the assumption that 
factors that affect migration also affect trafficking. I argue that labour opportunities 
and power to make decisions for women affect the size of the trafficking outflows. In 
countries where women have some rights but are not seen as equal to men is where I 
find trafficking to be the most prominent. Information obtained through schools, 
Internet, mass media or migrants returning home is likely to drive the aspiration of 
migration in countries where there are few career opportunities and decision 
possibilities for women. Policies to reduce trafficking should thus aim at increasing 
female labour force participation and empowering women. 
 
In order to create well-functioning policies to reduce human trafficking more research 
is needed. Data of good quality is essential to improve the knowledge about 
trafficking and this is why I end my thesis with a call for the collection of better data.
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1. Introduction 
 
Human trafficking is an emerging crime leading millions of people into a life without 
control over their time, money or body. According to the Trafficking in Persons Report 
2012 more than 20.9 million people are victims of trafficking. People are trafficked from 
over 136 different source countries and brought to over 118 host countries
1
. Due to its 
international character, countries need to work together to combat the problem. If we are 
to reduce trafficking we first need more information  (UNODC, 2009 and UNODC, 
2012). This thesis is an effort to contribute with some information and to shed light on 
what we can call modern slavery. In particular I ask whether gender equality plays a role 
in explaining from what countries people are trafficked. 
 
One of the main challenges with research on human trafficking is the variation in 
defining the problem. Throughout this thesis I will use the definition used by the UN 
from the (Palermo) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, 
especially women and children; 
 
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of 
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” 
(United Nations, 2004, p. 42). 
 
This definition includes some crucial features of human trafficking: the recruitment, 
                                                 
1
 A figure showing the countries covered in the data collection of UNODC can be found 
in the appendix. 
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transportation and harbouring of people and the use of fraud and coercion in order to 
exploit individuals for profit. The use of coercion distinguishes human trafficking from 
human smuggling; a victim of trafficking is unlike an illegal migrant not free when the 
destination is reached (Hernandez & Rudolph, 2011, Danailova-Trainor & Laczko, 
2010). 
The main question I aim to answer is whether gender equality decreases the proportion of 
trafficking in human beings out of a country. My main hypothesis is that an increase in 
equality first has a positive effect on trafficking outflows and then a negative effect as 
countries become more egalitarian. Does gender equality have a nonlinear effect on 
human trafficking? The purpose of this thesis is to answer that question. 
 
There are many types of human trafficking; forced labour, sex trafficking and child 
soldiers are among the major forms of trafficking (US, 2011). Even though a significant 
and increasing amount of trafficking victims are male, the majority of detected victims 
are still women and girls (US, 2013). This is why I chose to look at the opportunities for 
women and how that affects trafficking outflows. Domestic trafficking is common not 
only in large transitional countries but also in small countries as for instance some 
European countries (UNODC, 2009). Despite the large amount of internal trafficking I 
focus only on international trafficking in this thesis due to the lack of data that includes 
domestic trafficking.  
 
The literature suggests that human trafficking is closely linked to migration (Cho, (2012), 
Cho (2012b),  Mahmoud & Trebesch (2010), Rao & Presenti (2012), Hernandez & 
Rudolph (2011)). The results from Rao & Presenti (2012) imply that the problems of 
human trafficking cannot be solved without adressing the factors driving migration. This 
is why I in this thesis base my arguments on the assumption that factors that affect 
migration also affect trafficking. 
 
There is no agreement in the literature on what determines human trafficking. By looking 
at 78 different push factors suggested in the litterature Cho (2012) finds that income, 
information flows through mass media and internet, the size of the food, beverage and 
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tobacco industries and being a transition economy are statistically significant. She argues 
that low income and exposure to information from abroad encourage migration while 
large food, beverage and tobacco industries demand a lot of low-skilled labour which put 
a damper on migration. When less people migrate the pool of potential trafficking victims 
also decreases. Being a transition economy, she argues, can lead to insecure livelihoods 
which can explain the increase in trafficking outflows from these economies.  
 
Cho (2012) also looks at whether gender discrimination affects trafficking outflows. She 
finds no effect on either in- or outflows of trafficking but argues that it might be due to 
nonlinear effects. One of Hernandez & Rudolph (2011)`s hypotheses is that women’s 
political rights have a nonlinear effect on trafficking. The signs of the coefficients suggest 
the hypothesis might be correct but the results are not statistically significant thus one 
cannot conclude that their hypothesis is right.  In this thesis I will use one of the gender 
variables from Cho (2012), female labour force participation, as well as a variable for 
political participation, the share of women in parliament, to see if I get a different result 
and indeed if there is a nonlinear relationship. 
 
Using cross-national data from the World Bank and from the Trafficking in Persons 
Report 2006 (UNODC, 2006) I find that female labour force participation does not have a 
statistically significant correlation with trafficking outflows, which is in line with the 
results from Cho (2012). I go on to use a nonlinear model and find that both female 
labour force participation and the share of women in parliament increase the amount of 
trafficking out of a country at low levels and decrease trafficking outflows for higher 
levels. This is in line with my hypothesis.  
 
Following Cho (2012) I argue that income and labour opportunities affect the size of the 
trafficking outflows. In countries where women to some degree have equal opportunities 
as men they can get information about other countries through mass media and Internet as 
well as through their education. This combined with few career opportunities at home, I 
argue, may encourage them to seek work opportunities abroad. If these women are also 
credit constrained they become especially vulnerable to traffickers who offer work 
 4 
abroad. In countries where gender inequality is so large that women are prevented from 
getting an education, information and leaving their homes on their own, the likelihood of 
women migrating is low, which also causes the amount of trafficking from these 
countries to be low. The same goes for countries where men and women are close to 
having the same opportunities, women do not have the same incentives to migrate 
therefore trafficking outflows are low. 
 
I build up my thesis by starting with some background information on human trafficking 
and the connection to migration, debt and gender inequality. In part 3 I present the data I 
will use and the empirical strategy. The models are estimated using the statistical 
software package StataMP 13. In part 4 I presents the results before I discuss them and 
conclude in part 5. 
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2. Literature review and theory 
 
There is a lack of economic literature on human trafficking despite it being a 
multibillion business (Interpol) that has immense influence on people’s lives. As 
stated by US President Obama; 
 
“It ought to concern every person, because it’s a debasement of our common 
humanity. It ought to concern every community, because it tears at the social 
fabric. It ought to concern every business, because it distorts markets. It ought 
to concern every nation, because it endangers public health and fuels violence 
and organized crime. I’m talking about the injustice, the outrage, of human 
trafficking, which must be called by its true name – modern slavery.”  (US 
Department of State, 2013, p.7) 
 
Regardless of Obamas concern and the raising awareness of this crime against 
humanity, the limited numbers of victim identification causes data collection and thus 
research to be difficult. The nature of trafficking, where victims are often from 
marginalized populations performing domestic work and have often migrated 
illegally, makes victim identification especially difficult (US, 2013).  
 
”While it has been argued that factors such as poverty, inequality, limited 
immigration possibilities and the social and economic marginalization of 
women are likely to play a significant role, until very recently there had not 
been any research on this” (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, Forthcoming, p. 15) 
Migration 
Fortunately the interest in the topic is growing and so is the research pool. In line with 
recent research contribution I look at human trafficking as closely linked to migration 
and thus the factors that affect migration may also explain human trafficking (Cho, 
(2012),  Cho (2012b), Mahmoud & Trebesch (2010), Rao & Presenti (2012), 
Hernandez & Rudolph (2011)). Hernandez & Rudolph(2011) find that flows of 
migrants and refugees between a source-host country pair increase the number of 
trafficked victims between those countries. Looking at data from Germany Cho 
(2012b) also finds evidence that migration networks increase human trafficking 
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inflows. “These findings suggest that trafficking mafias have a better chance of 
finding potential victims when there is a considerable population willing to relocate” 
(Hernandez & Rudolph, 2011, p. 16). Traffickers are driven by profit. They want to 
exploit victims where the revenues are highest but they also search to minimize the 
costs and the risks of trafficking. Finding potential people to traffic among those who 
want to migrate reduces the costs (Hernandez & Rudolph, 2011).  
The hope of improved life quality abroad tempts many people into migration. Victims 
of human trafficking are mostly migrants who get exploited by traffickers on their 
way to their destination (Cho, 2012b). In a world where migration policies in 
developed countries are strict and the option to legally migrate is often not available, 
trafficking and exploitation are natural consequences (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010). 
In line with the results from Mahmoud & Trebesch (2010), that traffickers take 
advantage of shadow migration industries, evidence from the IOM Counter-
Trafficking-Module shows that most of the victims were recruited through personal 
connections or agencies and not in the first run forced into migration (Cho, 2012). In 
short, traffickers take advantage of vulnerable people who are willing to take risks to 
improve their lives.   
 
Mahmoud & Trebesch (2010) sugest two channels at work predicting the increase in 
individual trafficking risks when emigration increases. The first channel (demand) 
predicts that areas with a lot of emigration also has many potential victims of 
trafficking and thus it is easy for traffickers to recruite victims at a low cost. It is not 
easy to distinguish traffickers from middlemen offering help to emigrate illegally 
which makes it easier for traffickers to recruit people in areas where emigration is 
large. The second channel (supply) suggests that people are willing to take risks to get 
an opportunity to work abroad when living conditions in the region are poor. 
”Migrants departing from high-migration areas are likely to be negatively self-
selected and share characteristics that make them more vulnerable to trafﬁcking” 
(Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010,p. 174). 
Debt 
Akee et al (2010)  find that transportation costs play an important role in the descision 
to migrate. Even though travel expences have decreased it is still costly to migrate, 
mostly because the legal barriers to migration are high. The only option is often to 
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migrate illegally and in order to succefully migrate the use of intermediares is 
common. They have the know-how needed to cross boarders and start a new life 
abroad and make this their business. “The borders between smuggling and trafficking 
become blurred when migrants voluntarily use the services of smugglers only to find 
themselves in coercive situations and thus become the victims of traffickers” 
(Aronowitz, 2001, p. 167). 
Most low-skilled migrants cannot afford to finance their migration in advance and 
enter a contract with the intermediares (Friebel & Guriev, 2012). Because they 
borrow money they are more vulnerable than other migrants (ILO, 2005). They often 
use their labour as collateral and it creates a debt bondage where the person can easily 
be exploited (Aronowitz, 2001). Because of its illegal nature, the enforcement of the 
contract between the migrant and the intermediare is difficult (Friebel & Guriev, 
2012).  Violence, threats and spiritual rituals are used to force migrants to pay their 
debts. The migrants fear of being deported gives the intermediares an advantage.  
Evidence from Nigeria suggests that women trafficked are often offered a job abroad 
through an informal nettwork, consisting of people from their own area (Carling, 
2005). Once they arrive to the destination they become victims of exploitative debt 
bondage and have to work for a few years in order to repay the debt (UNODC, 
2009b). Often it is first after arrival to the destination country, when the person is not 
free to walk, that she can be determined a trafficked victim (Aronowitz, 2001). 
The availability of information is crucial and distinguishes smuggling from 
trafficking. The latter involves manipulation of information where migrants do not 
have full information about the enforcement of the contract (Friebel & Guriev, 2006). 
The traffickers exploit the information gap and coerce people with hope of a better 
life into giving up their freedom as collateral (US, 2011). 
Push factors 
Human trafficking is driven by profits. Some people pay for the exploitation of 
humans, which causes trafficking to exist. “Poverty, unemployment, lack of 
opportunity, social upheaval, and political instability facilitate traffickers’ ability to 
recruit victims, but they do not in themselves cause trafficking” (US, 2011 p.19). Still 
it is interesting to find out what facilitates the recruitment of victims, what drives 
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migration and trafficking.  
 
The largest trafficking flows are within or out of developing countries. In spite of this, 
human trafficking and development have been treated as two separate policy areas. 
“Efforts to promote human development have not focused very much on the fight 
against trafficking, and policies to tackle trafficking tend not to be linked to wider 
measures to promote human development“ (Danailova-Trainor & Laczko, 2010, 
p.39). The factors affecting trafficking are connected to development, which suggests 
that when setting policies one should look closer at the impact development has on 
trafficking. 
 
Push factors refer to characteristics of the source country that lead to increased 
emigration. Since trafficking is closely linked to migration, the same factors also 
increase trafficking outflows (Hernandez & Rudolph, 2011). The most frequently 
reported push factors are high unemployment, segregated labour markets, gender 
discrimination, low life quality and the lack of opportunity to improve it, sexual or 
ethnic discrimination, poverty, persecution, violence or abuse, human rights 
violations, collapse of the social infrastructure and other environmental conditions 
including conflict and war (Europol, 2011).  
Gender inequality 
Some push factors are especially relevant for female migration. In countries where 
gender inequality is large, where women are economically vulnerable and do not have 
the capacity to make decisions, the female migratory pressure, and thus the likelihood 
of being trafficked, increases (Hernandez & Rudolph, 2011). Without adequate labour 
opportunities at home, a job abroad seems more attractive. When women are exposed 
to discrimination in employment combined with household duties, childcare, lack of 
water and electricity and lack of part-time employment opportunities, they are trapped 
in low-paying jobs and low-productivity businesses, often in the informal sector 
(World Bank, 2012). 
 
“An increase in female labor force participation does not always lead to 
economic empowerment as long as such demand for female labor is based on 
women’s acceptance of poor payment and exploitative working conditions. 
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Although Stolper-Samuelson-type trade theory predicts that an increase in 
female labor will eventually lead to higher female wages and working 
conditions, empirical evidence rarely supports this theoretical prediction as long 
as there is an abundance of unemployed females available in those developing 
countries”  (Cho, 2011, p.5) 
 
When women are paid less they also have less incentive to work and they are more 
often in and out of the labour force. Danailova-Trainor & Belser (2006) assume that a 
higher amount of unemployed young women makes it easier for traffickers to recruit 
women. They find that when female youth employment increases by one percent, the 
number of trafficking victims increase by the same fraction of the population. Cho 
(2012) also argues that employment structures affect the vulnerability of migrants and 
that better employment opportunities for the unskilled workers can reduce trafficking. 
In the World Development Report on gender equality and development access to 
economic opportunities for women is one of the 4 priorities suggested in order to 
reduce gender gaps (World Bank, 2012). That includes relaxing women’s time 
constraints and reducing institutional biases and information problems. 
 
When women do not earn their own income they are less likely to make household 
decisions. A higher income gives more bargaining power and when women get a say, 
they invest more in health and in their children which makes them less vulnerable to 
shocks (World Bank, 2012). This can in turn reduce trafficking because women are 
not pushed to the limit. Women make different decisions than men, not only in the 
household but also when they are given political power. “Women’s participation in 
decision-making processes is important in moving toward more gender-equal 
societies” (World Bank, 2012, p. 176). When women are heard, programs against 
trafficking are perhaps more likely to be implemented because trafficking affects 
women the most. 
Rao and Presenti (2012) suggest two mechanisms to explain the assumption that 
gender inequality is seen as a push factor for trafficking. The first mechanism is that if 
those trafficked are economic migrants, women’s decision to migrate would be 
affected by the expected future income for women, which is influenced by gender 
inequality. The second mechanism is that gender inequality, hence fewer economic 
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opportunities for women, makes women being valued less and reduces the costs for 
traffickers (Rao & Presenti, 2012). Both mechanisms are affected by the lack of 
labour opportunities for women.  
 
Rao and Presenti (2012) find the only gender inequality indicator to be statistically 
significant was the female-male income ratio which was positively correlated with the 
incidence of trafficking origin. ” It is in societies permissive enough to allow women 
to travel alone and be potential economic migrants – indeed, to have aspirations to 
economic mobility – that we are likely to see trafficking originate” (Rao & Presenti, 
2012). Cho (2012) finds no correlation between trafficking and the gender- related 
indicators; Female unemployment rate, female labour force participation, women’s 
economic and social rights, literacy rate of women 15+ and 15-24 years old. But she 
argues that factors that are not robust may still affect human trafficking indirectly or 
when interacting with other factors. Cho (2012) does find that fertility rates and the 
share of population under 14 have decreasing effects on trafficking outflows and 
suggests this is due to the fact that  more children reduces women’s mobility (Cho, 
2012).  
Nonlinearity 
“One of the most common assumptions about “average” trafficking victims is 
that they come from the poorest, most isolated communities. Studies of 
populations in countries of origin for transnational and internal trafficking 
have shown that the incidence of trafficking is highest among those who have 
become empowered enough to aspire to a better life but have few good options 
for fulfilling those aspirations”  (US, 2011, p. 24) 
 
People in the poorest regions do not have the resources to migrate (UNODC, 2010). 
They might not even see it as a possibility as the aspiration of an improved life often 
stems from the impression mass media gives of other regions or from people returning 
home which is less common to observe in poorer areas. The countries with highest 
gender inequality are often poor. In addition to the lack of resources to migrate there 
may also be barriers to mobility for women who may not be able to migrate alone  
(Jakobsson & Kotsadam, Forthcoming). The demand in host countries may also be 
larger for women with some level of education or for women from the middle and 
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upper middle classes in the developing world  (Rao & Presenti, 2012). This reduces 
the trafficking outflows from the poorest areas.  
 
This can explain why Rao and Presenti (2012) and Cho (2012) find no indication that 
gender inequality leads to more trafficking. Cho (2012) suggests herself that it might 
be due to nonlinearity. “Beyond a certain level of autonomy for women, allowing 
them to migrate, gender discrimination in education and employment plays a crucial 
role in pushing victims”(Cho, 2012, p.19). This may also explain why being a 
transition economy made a country nineteen times more likely to be classified in the 
highest trafﬁcking category by UNODC (2006) (Rao & Presenti, 2012). 
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3. Data and empirical strategy 
 
In spite of being one of the largest criminal industries in the world, data on trafficking 
in human beings is scarce. Unlike other illegal activities, like drugs and arms 
trafficking, not much data is collected on human trafficking. This makes research on 
the topic difficult. One of the main obstacles has been to find data that can be 
compared across regions, countries and time. The IOM Counter-Trafficking Module 
contains data with in-depth information on the characteristics of over 10 000 victims 
from 130 countries  (Cho, 2012) but the dataset is not available for any other than 
IOM employees and thus we have not seen any analysis of this data. The lack of panel 
data unfortunately makes it difficult to control for unobserved country and time 
effects.  
 
Data 
Most researchers use the definition on human trafficking from the Palermo protocol, 
but in spite of this, there are still different understandings of the phenomenon and in 
some countries data on migrants that are smuggled and data on humans that are 
trafficked are mixed. Due to different understandings of the term trafficking in human 
beings I have chosen to use data on trafficking from one source, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to be able to compare countries. The data is 
taken from the Trafficking in Person Report 2006, which documents trafficking from 
127 origin countries to 137 host countries (UNODC, 2006). It is collected from 
various open sources that registered trafficking between 1996 and 2003. The sources 
used were individual source institutions, governmental institutions, NGOs, 
international organisations, research institutes, news agencies and national criminal 
justice organisations. Research teams registered 4950 accounts of trafficking into the 
database. The countries were classified on a scale from very low to very high in three 
categories, origin, transit and destination countries, according to the number of times 
the country was cited as being an origin, transit or destination country. One reported 
incident was, no matter how many victims, counted as one incident of trafficking in 
the database. This reduces the geographical bias (UNODC, 2006). Even though 
efforts were made to ensure a broad geographical coverage, there is a bias towards 
developed countries, a large amount of the sources are organizations with a focus on 
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North America and Western Europe. Another issue is that the research team based the 
data collection on the definition from the Palermo protocol but the source institutions 
may have used different definitions, which have led to an overrepresentation of sex 
trafficking and no account of internal trafficking. In this thesis I only look at data 
from countries classified as origin countries
2
. The main variable I use is trafficking 
outflows that takes values from 1 to 5 depending on the amount of trafficking 
reported out of a country. 
Data on gender inequality is easily accessible and I have chosen to use data from the 
World Bank for the year 2006 as this is the year from which the main variable is 
taken. The data from the World Bank is a collection of development indicators from 
officially recognized international sources and is the most up-to-date data on global 
development (World Bank, 2014). As a proxy for gender inequality female labour 
force participation, measured as the proportion of the female population over 15 that 
are part of the labour force, and the share of women in parliament are chosen. 
In order to avoid omitted variable bias I include GDP and population as control 
variables. They are taken from The World Bank and are an average of the World 
Development Indicators 1996-2003. GDP is measured per capita in 2000 US $. To see 
if there are other gender variables driving the result I include parental authority, 
inheritance, polygamy acceptance, freedom of movement, dress code in public, 
violence against women, son preference, women’s access to land, property other than 
land and loans. These variables are taken from OECDs Gender, Institutions and 
Development database and cover 121 countries in all regions of the world. These 
variables are not continuous, which makes it difficult to look at nonlinearity. That is 
why I do not use these measures as main variables.  
                                                 
2
 A figure and table of the countries included can be found in the appendix. 
 14 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the main variables 
 
 Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max 
      
Dependent variable      
Trafficking outflows 159 2.352 1.539 0 5 
Main independent 
variables 
     
Women in parliament 218 15.72 9.584 0 48.80 
Labour participation 214 51.60 15.80 12.70 88.80 
Control variables      
GDP 169 8.799 9.291 0.512 51.44 
Population 207 28.86 115.6 0.0197 1,256 
Parental authority 119 0.403 0.418 0 1 
Inheritance 118 0.407 0.539 0 5 
Polygamy acceptance 121 0.434 0.403 0 1 
Freedom of movement 120 0.150 0.248 0 1 
Dresscode in public 121 0.120 0.250 0 1 
Violence against women 120 0.577 0.242 0 1 
Son preference 120 0.129 0.229 0 1 
Women’s access to land 119 0.349 0.316 0 1 
Women’s access to loans 120 0.258 0.290 0 1 
Women’s access to property 120 0.258 0.290 0 1 
      
 
Empirical strategy 
I perform a cross-sectional study where I use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation method. The baseline specification I use is:  
 
Trafficking outflowsi=β0Labour participationi + β1Women in parliamenti +β2Xi +εi 
 
Trafficking outflows is the amount of trafficking out of country i, Labour 
participation is the proportion of women over 15 who take part in the labour force, 
Women in parliament is the rate of women in parliament, X is a vector of control 
variables including GDP and population and εi is the normally distributed error term.  
 
My hypothesis is that there is a nonlinear relationship between gender equality and 
human trafficking outflows. To check for this I use this specification: 
 
Trafficking outflowsi=β0Labour participationi +β1 Labour participationi 
2
+β2 Women 
in parliamenti +β3 Women in parliamenti 
2 
+β4Xi +εi 
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As robustness checks I add other gender variables as controls. I also include regional 
dummy variables to see if some regions drive the result. Finally I check that it is 
robust when using ordered logistic regression since the main variable takes 1 of 5 
values. In all regressions I use robust standard errors. 
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4. Results 
 
Migration 
Before I start looking at how gender equality affects trafficking, I want to check that 
migration and trafficking are indeed correlated as recent literature suggests. To do this 
I use data on migration from the World Development Indicators. 
 Table 2: Correlation between trafficking outflows and emigration 
 
          
 
Trafficking outflows Emigration Population GDP 
          
Trafficking outflows 1 
   
     Emigration 0,32 1 
  
 
(0.00) 
   Population 0,21 0,62 1 
 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
  GDP -0,6 -0,11 -0,04 1 
 
(0.00) (0.30) (0.61) 
           
Significance level in parentheses 
 
The result shows a positive correlation between trafficking outflows and emigration. 
From table 2 we also see that GDP is negatively correlated to both emigration and 
trafficking outflows and that population is positively correlated to the amount of 
emigration and trafficking out of a country. This corresponds with the migration 
literature.   
Baseline specification 
I go on performing an OLS regression of GDP and population on trafficking outflows.
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Table 3: Relation between GDP, population and trafficking outflows 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Trafficking 
outflows 
  
GDP -0.0964*** 
 (0.0102) 
Population 0.00207*** 
 (0.000476) 
Constant 3.144*** 
 (0.136) 
  
Observations 143 
R-squared 0.389 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From the regression result we see that GDP has a statistically significant negative 
correlation with the amount of trafficking out of a country and an increase in the size 
of the population has a statistically significant positive correlation, which seems 
logical. In countries with high GDP people do not have the same need to migrate and 
are not as vulnerable to trafficking and in countries with a large population there are 
more people that can be subjected to trafficking. Since these variables are related to 
trafficking outflows, they are included as control variables. 
 
The next step is to look for a correlation between the main variables women in 
parliament, labour participation and trafficking outflows. 
Table 4: Correlation between trafficking outflows, women in parliament and 
labour participation 
 
        
 
Trafficking outflows Women in parliament Labour participation 
Trafficking outflows 1.00 
  
    Women in parliament -0.14 1.00 
 
 
(0.09) 
  Labour participation 0.12 0.21 1.00 
 
(0.14) (0.00) 
         
Significance level in parentheses 
 
The share of women in parliament is negative and statistically significantly correlated 
to trafficking outflows. Female labour force participation is positively correlated with 
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trafficking outflows, but it is not statistically significant. Looking at the data I believe 
the model to be misspecified and when I test for nonlinearity with a Ramsey 
Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) test, I can reject the model 
being linear at the 5% level. The RESET test adds higher powers of the variables to 
the regression to test whether the regression is linear (Wooldridge, 2010).   
Table 5: RESET test of the baseline specification 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Trafficking 
outflows 
  
Labour participation 0.00629 
 (0.00572) 
Women in parliament 0.00301 
 (0.0114) 
Population 0.00207*** 
 (0.000475) 
GDP -0.101*** 
 (0.0121) 
Constant 2.808*** 
 (0.345) 
  
Observations 137 
R-squared 0.426 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Trafficking outflows 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 129) =      7.46 
Prob > F =      0.0001 
Nonlinearity 
The results from the RESET test suggest that there are nonlinearities so I add women 
in parliament and labour participation squared to the model.  
 
 19 
Table 6: Nonlinear relation between women in parliament, labour participation 
and trafficking outflows 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
      
Women in parliament 0.122***  0.118***  0.0898*** 
 (0.0447)  (0.0305)  (0.0312) 
Women in 
parliament
2 
-0.00349***  -0.00268***  -0.00203*** 
 (0.00107)  (0.000649)  (0.000662) 
Labour participation  0.0187  0.111*** 0.0867*** 
  (0.0260)  (0.0266) (0.0272) 
Labour participation
2 
 -7.43e-05  -0.00101*** -0.000812*** 
  (0.000247)  (0.000245) (0.000251) 
Population   0.00195*** 0.00199*** 0.00188*** 
   (0.000457) (0.000467) (0.000451) 
GDP   -0.100*** -0.108*** -0.110*** 
   (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0123) 
Constant 1.644*** 1.614** 2.215*** 0.486 0.440 
 (0.389) (0.619) (0.306) (0.651) (0.603) 
      
Observations 148 151 138 140 137 
R-squared 0.102 0.015 0.458 0.463 0.504 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Columns 1 and 3 indicate a positive but decreasing relation between women in 
parliament and trafficking outflows both with and without control variables. Column 
2 and 4 indicates a positive but decreasing relation between labour participation and 
trafficking outflows. The relation is statistically significant when GDP and population 
are added as control variables. Column 5 shows the complete model and both women 
in parliament and labour participation have a statistically significant positive and 
decreasing correlation with trafficking outflows. 
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Figure 1: Correlation between women in parliament and trafficking outflows 
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Figure 2: Correlation between labour participation and trafficking outflows 
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The figures show the correlation between women in parliament, labour participation 
and trafficking outflows. Without GDP and population as control variables the 
nonlinear relation between labour participation and trafficking outflows is not clear 
but from the regression results we see that when population and GDP are added, 
labour participation has a positive and decreasing correlation with trafficking 
outflows.   
Robustness checks 
As control variables I add one by one the gender variables parental authority, 
inheritance, polygamy acceptance, freedom of movement, dress code in public, legal 
indicator of violence against women, son preference and women’s access to land, 
property other than land and loans.  
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Table 7: Parental authority, inheritance, polygamy acceptance, freedom of 
movement and dress code in public added as control variables 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
      
Labour participation 0.0659** 0.0673** 0.0823*** 0.0857*** 0.0707** 
 (0.0290) (0.0263) (0.0286) (0.0304) (0.0328) 
Labour participation
2 
-0.000630** -0.000668*** -0.000756*** -0.000826*** -0.000726** 
 (0.000260) (0.000245) (0.000265) (0.000276) (0.000287) 
Women in parliament 0.0329 0.0793** 0.0609* 0.0617* 0.0461 
 (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0334) (0.0340) (0.0346) 
Women in parliament
2 
-0.000946 -0.00176** -0.00140* -0.00136* -0.00110 
 (0.000761) (0.000783) (0.000744) (0.000753) (0.000744) 
Population 0.00183*** 0.00165*** 0.00179*** 0.00187*** 0.00199*** 
 (0.000377) (0.000348) (0.000366) (0.000383) (0.000424) 
GDP -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0313) (0.0334) (0.0327) (0.0322) 
Parental authority -0.986***     
 (0.280)     
Inheritance  -0.523**    
  (0.208)    
Polygamy acceptance   -0.464*   
   (0.262)   
Freedom of movement    -0.497  
    (0.410)  
Dresscode in public     -0.985* 
     (0.571) 
Constant 1.932** 1.387* 0.970 0.827 1.507 
 (0.780) (0.700) (0.763) (0.761) (0.952) 
      
Observations 96 95 97 97 97 
R-squared 0.435 0.415 0.385 0.373 0.385 
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Table 8: Legal indicator of violence against women, son preference and women’s 
access to land, property other than land and loans added as control variables 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
I do not find that adding the gender variables as control variables alter the result 
except that women in parliament is no longer statistically significant when some of 
the control variables are added. The fact that other gender variables do not change the 
results suggests a strong linkage between labour opportunities for women and 
women’s political participation and human trafficking. The results do not alter when 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
      
Labour participation 0.0940*** 0.0800** 0.0879*** 0.0908*** 0.0821*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0343) (0.0291) (0.0284) (0.0277) 
Labour participation
2 
-0.000889*** -0.000791** -0.000815*** -0.000847*** -0.000754*** 
 (0.000257) (0.000305) (0.000269) (0.000261) (0.000260) 
Women in parliament 0.0620* 0.0603* 0.0564 0.0581 0.0505 
 (0.0369) (0.0349) (0.0390) (0.0350) (0.0352) 
Women in parliament
2 
-0.00134* -0.00136* -0.00125 -0.00128 -0.00118 
 (0.000807) (0.000762) (0.000860) (0.000786) (0.000780) 
Population 0.00178*** 0.00238*** 0.00172*** 0.00175*** 0.00177*** 
 (0.000375) (0.000847) (0.000358) (0.000374) (0.000364) 
GDP -0.120*** -0.114*** -0.128*** -0.141*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0325) (0.0329) (0.0358) (0.0320) 
Violence against women -0.199     
 (0.431)     
Son preference  -0.809    
  (0.946)    
Women’s access to land   -0.505   
   (0.382)   
Women’s access to loans    -0.835**  
    (0.381)  
Women’s access to property     -1.004*** 
     (0.330) 
Constant 0.633 1.027 0.880 0.920 1.150 
 (0.781) (0.895) (0.744) (0.766) (0.706) 
      
Observations 97 97 96 97 97 
R-squared 0.367 0.374 0.378 0.397 0.411 
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all the variables are included at the same time either but both labour participation and 
women in parliament become statistically insignificant
3
.  
 
In table 9 I have added 7 regional dummy variables. The regions are Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), 
North America (NA) and South Asia (SA). Both labour participation and women in 
parliament continue to have a positive and decreasing correlation with trafficking 
outflows even though the results from labour participation become statistically 
insignificant.  
 
In table 10 I exclude the regions one by one and we see that none of the regions drive 
the result. Both labour participation and women in parliament retain a positive and 
decreasing correlation with trafficking outflows, although a few of the results become 
statistically insignificant when certain regions are excluded. That applies for labour 
participation when the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are 
excluded. When the Middle East and North Africa dummy is excluded, women in 
parliament also turns out to not have a statistically significant relation to trafficking 
outflows. This can indicate that the relation between women’s labour and political 
opportunities are especially important in order to avoid trafficking outflows in 
countries located in the Middle East and North Africa.  
                                                 
3
 Results from the regression with all the gender variables can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Table 9: Regression with all the regional dummy variables 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Trafficking outflows 
    
Labour participation 0.0439 
 
(0.0309) 
Labour participation2 -0.000403 
 
(0.000275) 
Women in parliament 0.0508* 
 
(0.0300) 
Women in parliament2 -0.00124* 
 
(0.000641) 
Population 0.00115*** 
 
(0.000367) 
GDP -0.145*** 
 
(0.0194) 
EAP 0.293 
 
(0.336) 
ECA 0.542* 
 
(0.300) 
LAC -0.790** 
 
(0.368) 
MENA -0.972** 
 
(0.396) 
NA 2.083*** 
 
(0.604) 
SSA -0.880*** 
 
(0.281) 
Constant 2.382*** 
 
(0.827) 
  Observations 137 
R-squared 0.629 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Regression with the regional dummy variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
(1) 
 
(SA 
excluded) 
(ECA  
excluded) 
(MENA  
excluded) 
(EAP  
excluded) 
(SSA  
excluded) 
(LAC  
excluded) 
(NA  
excluded) 
VARIABLES 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
Trafficking 
outflows 
                  
Labour participation 0.0867*** 0.0892*** 0.0531* 0.0553 0.0884*** 0.0471 0.108*** 0.0887*** 
 
(0.0272) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0387) (0.0275) (0.0325) (0.0287) (0.0274) 
Labour participation2 -0.000812*** -0.000829*** -0.000450* -0.000573* -0.000851*** -0.000220 -0.00104*** -0.000841*** 
 
(0.000251) (0.000262) (0.000264) (0.000334) (0.000254) (0.000320) (0.000265) (0.000253) 
Women in parliament 0.0898*** 0.0865*** 0.0852** 0.0451 0.0901*** 0.121*** 0.0977*** 0.0851*** 
 
(0.0312) (0.0327) (0.0334) (0.0379) (0.0314) (0.0381) (0.0329) (0.0310) 
Women in parliament2 -0.00203*** -0.00196*** -0.00190*** -0.00121 -0.00196*** -0.00301*** -0.00212*** -0.00186*** 
 
(0.000662) (0.000685) (0.000720) (0.000733) (0.000667) (0.000893) (0.000689) (0.000661) 
Population 0.00188*** 0.00222*** 0.00221*** 0.00176*** 0.00254* 0.00137*** 0.00152*** 0.00173*** 
 
(0.000451) (0.000782) (0.000476) (0.000433) (0.00128) (0.000401) (0.000348) (0.000357) 
GDP -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.0955*** -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.119*** -0.117*** -0.116*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0181) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0153) (0.0133) (0.0135) 
Constant 0.440 0.354 0.798 1.853* 0.367 0.968 0.138 0.483 
 
(0.603) (0.624) (0.615) (1.107) (0.612) (0.667) (0.629) (0.603) 
         Observations 137 132 93 122 124 100 116 135 
R-squared 0.504 0.497 0.416 0.484 0.489 0.574 0.580 0.516 
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When I use ordered logistic regression
4
, the results are still statistically significant 
thus I consider the OLS results to be correct. 
 
Limitations 
The results show a clear nonlinear correlation between gender equality and trafficking 
outflows but we need to be careful not to interpret too much into the results due to the 
characteristics of the data. Without data from different time periods it is not possible 
to capture variations over time. As a consequence it is difficult to exclude factors that 
may have an effect on both gender and trafficking. Another issue is that the data on 
trafficking outflows is a measure for each country. This is problematic if there are 
large variations within one country, which is especially likely for large countries. One 
example would be Nigeria where there is a large amount of trafficking from certain 
regions as Edo and Delta and much less, or none, from other areas (Carling, 2005). 
There might be certain characteristics with these regions that are not captured when 
we look at the country as a whole.  
 
The data is collected by UNODC’s GPAT and 40% of the source institutions are 
located in Western Europe and North America. This may cause a bias towards 
countries located in these regions and the source countries of trafficked victims that 
are trafficked to western countries (UNODC, 2006). When I include regional dummy 
variables to see whether certain regions drive the results it shows that this is not the 
case.    
 
I argue that the relation between gender equality and human trafficking is nonlinear. 
If this is incorrect, the specification of the model is wrong and the results may not be 
correct. One final limitation is that there might be omitted variables. This will always 
be a problem, but I believe that I have checked for the variables that are most 
relevant. 
                                                 
4
 Results from the ordered logistic regression can be found in the appendix. 
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5. Discussions and Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have explored the nonlinear relation between gender equality and 
human trafficking outflows. Being aware of the limitations due to data, I still believe 
there is a strong indication that gender equality is important to consider when anti 
trafficking policies are set. This thesis has shed light on how important it is not only 
to focus on host countries but also to address the push factors of migration in the 
source countries in order to reduce trafficking. 
 
The results from this thesis show a correlation between migration and trafficking 
which makes it reasonable to make arguments based on the assumption that the push 
factors of migration also affects trafficking in human beings. The two channels 
suggested by Mahmoud & Trebesch (2010), which predicts that it is easier to recruite 
victims at low cost in areas with a lot of emigration and that migrants are more 
vulnerable than others to trafficking, can explain the connection between migration 
and trafficking outflows. The migration literature identify poverty as an important 
push factor of migration and the results in this thesis show that this is also the case for 
human trafficking. An increased amount of trafficking outflows from poorer countries 
indicates that trafficked victims seek opportunities abroad to improve their lives. 
 
The nonlinear relationship between the proxies for gender equality and human 
trafficking outflows indicate that it is in countries where women have some rights but 
are not seen as equal to men where trafficking is the most prominent. In countries 
where women have acquired certain rights but do not have the same working 
opportunities or political power as men, trafficking flows are at its largest. 
Information obtained through schools, Internet, mass media or migrants returning 
home is likely to drive the aspiration of migration. When people think that they can 
improve their lives and maybe even the lives of their family members by moving 
abroad, it becomes tempting to migrate, legal or not. When women are migrating 
illegally and in addition are credit constrained, they become especially vulnerable to 
trafficking. 
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In contrast to this, women who live in countries where they are largely discriminated 
are unlikely to be able to migrate and women who have close to equal rights as men 
do not have the incentive to migrate. In areas where women have few rights, they are 
less likely to get information about opportunities abroad. If they, in addition, are poor, 
the availability of information about other areas decreases further. Women’s freedom 
of movement in such areas can be very limited and to a large degree makes them 
dependent on their families or husbands. This makes migrating alone unlikely and can 
explain the low levels of trafficking. The low levels of trafficking outflows from 
countries where women are empowered are probably due to the lack of incentive for 
women to migrate. When women are empowered they are also more likely to know 
about the dangers of migrating, which makes them less vulnerable to human 
trafficking.  
 
As a proxy for gender equality I have used female labour force participation and the 
share of women in parliament which both are positively but decreasingly related to 
human trafficking outflows. The lack of career opportunities and few possibilities for 
political participation encourage women to seek work opportunities abroad. These 
results confirm Cho (2012)’s argument that better employment opportunities can 
reduce human trafficking because it makes migrants less vulnerable. The fact that 
these two gender indicators in particular have an effect on trafficking, suggests that 
policies should aim at increasing labour opportunities for women and women’s 
possibility to make policy descisions.  
 
Policies to increase female labour force participation can include skills training and 
wage subsidies as well as child care, electricity and technology to free up women’s 
time and give them capabilities to work.  Equality in the household, where both men 
and women take part in the household duties, is another factor. When there is an 
increase in the labour opportunities for women, the return on the investment of 
sending girls to school increases. This may, in addition to having a value in itself,  
lead to greater awareness of the risks attached to migration. If the lack of labour 
opportunities for women is indeed a driving force of human trafficking, as this thesis 
suggests, then policies to create jobs for women should be a large part of policies to 
combat trafficking.  
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When women are given power to make decisions they often make different 
investments than men. These investments are known to be in favour of children and 
the health and welfare of family members. I find that the share of women in 
parliament affects human trafficking which suggests that increasing the participation 
of women in politics should be an aim, not only to reduce gender inequality in 
general, but also to reduce trafficking. To increase women’s participation in politics, 
quotas have shown to have had a positive effect. Freeing up women’s time is also 
important in order to give women the opportunity to raise their voices.  
The availability of credit is connected to trafficking in two ways. First, women are 
less likely than men to receive credit to invest in their businesses. To enlarge 
microfinance initiatives and give women easier access to credit may thus create more 
work opportunities and reduce trafficking. Secondly, the lack of credit also leads 
migrants into debts with intermediaries, which makes them more vulnerable to 
trafficking. The solution to this problem is more difficult, but small loans to be able to 
migrate safely might be a solution.   
 
The lack of labour opportunities combined with information about other countries 
from mass media can lead to an urge to migrate. But mass media also gives an 
opportunity to increase awareness of trafficking. Encouraging media to present the 
risks of migration and the dangers of trafficking may have a reducing effect. 
Information campaigns are important but it is not in itself enough. If the basic needs 
of women are not met, knowing the dangers related to migration will not stop women 
from trying to migrate. 
It is important to mention that for low levels of gender equality a small improvement 
might actually lead to increased risk of trafficking. This does not lead to the 
conclusion that one should not promote equality.  Equality between genders is 
valuable on its own, and this thesis does not suggest that one at some level should 
work against it. It rather encourages putting in place policies that raise equality by a 
large amount. The findings in this thesis also call to mind that policies to reduce 
human trafficking are especially important in transition economies and in countries 
where gender equality is improving but still has a way to go. 
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Research suggestions 
Human trafficking is a large field with a lot of research opportunities that cries out for 
researchers. I would go as far as calling it a shame that we do not have more 
knowledge about this topic, as more research is crucial in order to abolish modern 
slavery. When one gets better data it would be interesting to take a closer look at 
characteristics of the victims, the traffickers and factors that push victims into 
trafficking. Is it indeed the aspiration for a better life that drives women into 
migration and then into trafficking? What distinguishes traffickers from 
intermediaries that facilitate illegal migration? And are the factors that push men and 
children into trafficking the same as they are for women? 
 
With micro data one can look at internal trafficking which constitutes a large part of 
the trafficking in the world. Are there certain push factors that are especially 
prominent when one looks at regions with a lot of trafficking within countries? Are 
these factors different from the factors that lead to international trafficking? In order 
to create policies that work well in reducing human trafficking these questions and 
many more are important to answer. 
 
Policies targeting source countries are important, but that does not mean that one 
should not in addition focus on the host countries. This thesis has not investigated the 
demand for trafficked victims in host countries, but there is no doubt that human 
trafficking would not exist if not for the fact that some people pay for the work of 
trafficked victims. It is therefore important to continue to have anti trafficking policies 
in host countries. This includes severe punishment of traffickers and policies that aim 
at changing norms, making it unacceptable to buy services from people who have 
been trafficked.  
 
Finally, I want to end my thesis with a call for the collection of better data and for 
sharing the data collected so that research on this important topic can continue to 
improve.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 3: Countries covered in the data collection of UNODC (UNODC, 2009) 
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Table 11: Description of the variables 
 
 
Description Source 
      
Dependent variable 
  Trafficking outflows 
 
The amount of trafficking out of a country 
(between 1=Very low and 5=very high) 
UNODC 
2006 
Main independent 
variables 
  
Women in parliament Share of women in parliament World Bank 
Labour participation Proportion of the female population (15+) in the labour force World Bank 
Control variables 
  
GDP 
GDP per capita in thousands. Measured in 2000 US $. WDI 
1996-2003 World Bank 
Population Population in thousand. WDI 1996-2003 World Bank 
Parental Authority 
Parental authority granted to father and mother equally  
(between 0=yes and 1=no). OECD 
Inheritance 
Inheritance practices in favour of male heirs 
( between 0=no and 1=yes). OECD 
Polygamy acceptance 
Acceptance or legality of polygamy  
(between 0=no and 1=complete acceptance / legality). OECD 
Freedom of movement 
Freedom to move freely outside of the house  
(level of discrimination between 0=none and 1=high). OECD 
Dresscode in public 
Obligation to wear a veil in public 
(level of discrimination between 0=none and 1=high) OECD 
Violence against women 
Legal indicator of violence against women  
(between 0=legislation in place and 1=no legislation OECD 
Son preference 
Son preference (missing women)  
(between  0= no women missing and 1- many women missing) OECD 
Women’s access to land 
Women's access to land ownership 
(between 0=full and 1=impossible). OECD 
Women’s access to loans 
Women's access to bank loans 
(between 0=full and 1=impossible). OECD 
Women’s access to property 
Women's rights to own property other than land 
(between 0=full and 1=no). OECD 
Emigration 
Net total of migrants 2009-2013. Only countries with net 
emigration are included. World Bank 
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Figure 4: Source countries of human trafficking (UNODC, 2006) 
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Table 12: UNODC source countries of human trafficking 
 
Very high High Medium Low Very low 
          
Albania Armenia  Afghanistan  Argentina    Brunei  
Belarus  Bangladesh  Algeria  Bhutan   Darussalam  
Bulgaria  Benin   Angola  Botswana   Chad   
China  Brazil  Azerbaijan  Burundi   Chile   
Lithuania  Cambodia  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Canada   Costa Rica 
Nigeria  Colombia  Burkina Faso  Cape Verde  Egypt    
Rep of Moldova  Czech Rep Cameroon   DR Congo  Fiji   
Romania Dominican Rep Congo Djibouti Jamaica   
Russian Federation  Estonia Cote d'Ivoire  Equatorial Guinea  Macao 
Thailand Georgia  Croatia Eritrea Netherlands  
Ukraine Ghana  Cuba  Gabon Paraguay 
 
Guatemala  Dem People's Rep of Korea Gambia Syrian Arab Rep 
 
Hungary  Ecuador   Guinea Uruguay  
 
India  El Salvador  Iran Yemen 
 
Kazakhstan  Ethiopia   Iraq 
 
 
Lao People's Dem Rep Haiti   Jordan   
 
 
Latvia Honduras   Lebanon   
 
 
Mexico  Hong Kong Lesotho  
 
 
Morocco  Indonesia Madagascar  
 
 
Myanmar  Kenya  Maldives  
 
 
Nepal  Kosovo Nicaragua  
 
 
Pakistan  Kyrgyzstan Panama   
 
 
Philippines  Liberia  Rwanda   
 
 
Poland  Malawi  Rep of Korea  
 
 
Slovakia  Malaysia  Somalia 
 
 
Uzbekistan  Mali  Sudan  
 
 
Vietnam Mozambique  Swaziland  
 
 
 
Niger Tunisia   
 
 
 
Peru  US of America  
 
 
 
Senegal  Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
Serbia and Montenegro  
 
 
 
 
Sierra Leone  
 
 
 
 
Singapore  
 
 
 
 
Slovenia  
 
 
 
 
South Africa  
 
 
 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
Macedonia  
 
 
 
 
Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
Togo    
 
 
 
 
Turkey  
 
 
 
 
Turkmenistan  
 
 
 
 
Uganda   
 
 
 
 
United Rep of Tanzania  
 
 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
     Zambia     
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Table 13: Regression with the gender variables 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Trafficking outflows 
    
Labour participation 0.0504 
 
(0.0330) 
Labour participation
2 
-0.000530* 
 
(0.000290) 
Women in parliament 0.0415 
 
(0.0447) 
Women in parliament
2 
-0.00117 
 
(0.000958) 
Population 0.00175** 
 
(0.000808) 
GDP -0.135*** 
 
(0.0388) 
Parental authority -0.952** 
 
(0.372) 
Inheritance -0.371** 
 
(0.166) 
Polygamy acceptance 0.150 
 
(0.325) 
Freedom of movement 0.558 
 
(0.570) 
Dresscode in public -0.544 
 
(0.609) 
Violence against women -0.0576 
 
(0.459) 
Son preference 0.0741 
 
(0.954) 
Women`s access to land 0.671 
 
(0.536) 
Women`s access to loans -0.268 
 
(0.454) 
Women`s access to property -0.611 
 
(0.472) 
Constant 2.523** 
 
(1.040) 
  Observations 93 
R-squared 0.486 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: Ordered logistic model 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Trafficking 
outflows 
 
Labour participation 
 
0.140*** 
 (0.0488) 
Labour participation
2 
-0.00132*** 
 (0.000461) 
Women in parliament 0.132** 
 (0.0604) 
Women in parliament
2 
-0.00300** 
 (0.00141) 
Population 0.00413** 
 (0.00189) 
GDP -0.193*** 
 (0.0277) 
cut1  
  
Constant 0.876 
 (1.126) 
cut2  
  
Constant 1.674 
 (1.113) 
cut3  
  
Constant 3.064*** 
 (1.141) 
cut4  
  
Constant 4.645*** 
 (1.185) 
cut5  
  
Constant 6.291*** 
 (1.234) 
  
Observations 137 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
